Abstract ___________________________________________________________________________ This paper investigates the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on the sensitivities of R&D investments to cash flows at firm level. We find that managerial risk-taking incentives have a significant impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity. For one standard deviation increase in vega (the change in dollar value of a CEO's option portfolio given a 1% change in the annualized standard deviation of a firm's stock returns), R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity will increase by 58.65%. Further investigation suggests that underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion may be the plausible explanation among competing theories. 
Introduction
Studies that examine the relationship between corporate investments and internal funds (e.g., cash flows) consist one of the largest strands of corporate finance literature. These studies usually focus on physical investments, i.e., capital expenditures, as the measure of corporate investments while intangible investments such as research and development (R&D) have been largely ignored. However, with rapid changes in technology development and increasing global competition in "knowledge-based" economy, the pivot of corporate investments has shifted from physical investments to R&D. R&D investment intensity has risen dramatically in the developed economies in the past two decades and even overtaken physical investments in some industries (Brown and Petersen 2009) . Thus, how R&D investments respond to the change of internal funds is an important yet not well examined research question. Moreover, extant empirical studies on the relationship between investments and cash flows are largely based on the methodology developed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) . 1 The implied assumption for this approach is that managers make optimal investment decisions and act in the best interests of shareholders.
However, financial theories have suggested that agency costs arising from the interest alignment between managers and shareholders also have a great impact on managers' use of internal funds and their investment behaviors. For example, a chief executive officer (CEO)'s wealth tends to be more firm specific and under diversified than that of a firm's shareholders. A self-interested, risk-averse CEO may forgo risky but positive net present value (NPV) projects and cause underinvestment problem even though there are enough internal funds to invest (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . To reduce this risk-related agency problem, shareholders use equity-based compensation (e.g., options) to align the interest of CEOs and shareholders and provide incentives in compensation contracts to encourage CEOs' appetite towards risky but positive NPV investments. For example, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) show that higher CEO compensation incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEOs' equity portfolio wealth to stock return volatility (i.e., vega), generate riskier policy choices such as greater investments in R&D, less investments in capital expenditures, more focused, and higher leverage.
In this paper, we investigate risk-taking incentives embedded in CEO compensation contracts and their effects on the sensitivity of R&D investments to cash flows. The purpose is motivated by providing new empirical evidence on the effectiveness of managerial incentives in reducing managerial related agency costs through their impacts on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Specifically, this paper draws implications from agency theory and information asymmetry framework to develop hypotheses and explore the channels through which managerial incentives will influence R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Extant studies on investment-cash flow sensitivity have mostly relied on capital expenditures as the measure of investments. In this paper, we focus on R&D spending as another dimension of corporate investments. From the perspective of investment theory, R&D has certain unique characteristics that make it different from regular investment such as capital expenditures. For example, in practice fifty percent or more of R&D spending is the compensation of research scientists and engineers. Their performance creates an intangible asset for a firm and the asset can be lost if R&D employees leave or are fired (Hall 2010) . Since it is difficult to evaluate an intangible asset explicitly as a tangible asset for external investors because of information spillover concern, R&D investments are largely at managers' discretion which is influenced by their risk-taking incentives. In addition, R&D investments usually have a greater degree of uncertainty in outputs than physical investments, especially at the early stage of a research project. This implies that an optimal R&D strategy has an option-like character and is impacted by managerial risk-taking incentives. Moreover, R&D investments usually have high adjustment costs and firms normally rely on internal funds to smooth R&D investment over the time,
suggesting that R&D investments are highly sensitive to a firm's cash flow level (Brown and Petersen 2011) . Taken above together, literature suggests that how managerial risk-taking incentives affect the relationship between R&D investments and cash flows is an important research question that deserves more attention. However, extant empirical studies have largely kept silence on the question.
Following current empirical papers (e.g., Guay 1999 , Core and Guay 2002 , Coles et al. 2006 , CEO compensation incentives are measured by the sensitivity of the dollar value of a CEO's equity portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and to stock price (delta). Both vega and delta measure the degree of interest alignment between CEOs and shareholders -the higher value of vega and delta, the better alignment. However, extant studies have shown that they have different effects on managerial risk-seeking behaviors. Vega is expected to be positively related to risk-taking incentives because the higher vega is, the greater the increase in CEO compensation in tandem with stock return volatility. On the other hand, the impact of delta on risk-taking incentives is ambiguous. For example, using a two-period model, John and John (1993) show that the riskiness of an investment policy implemented by a manager increases with the degree of pay-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta) because the more aligned management incentives are with shareholder value, the more risk-shifting incentives there are for managers.
Conversely, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that shareholders can structure compensation to influence risk-taking incentives of a risk-averse manager with a concave utility function.
Specifically, if compensation is structured as a linear function of stock price, it will force the manager's utility function to be a concave function of stock price, and the manager will reduce risk in utility maximizing. Thus, delta is expected to be negatively related to CEO risk-taking incentives because tying a CEO's wealth to stock prices will make a risk-averse CEO who is undiversified with respect to firm-specific risk less willing to increase the volatility of stock prices.
As discussed earlier, agency costs arising from managerial risk-aversion will make CEOs to shy away from risky projects with positive NPV and therefore cause underinvestment problem. If underinvestment is a predominant agency problem in a firm, then the CEO of the firm will invest less in risky projects from available cash flows than will the CEO of a similar firm where agency related underinvestment problem is less severe. To encourage CEOs to invest with greater risks, shareholders should provide CEOs with higher risk-taking incentives to mitigate managerial riskaversion and underinvestment of cash flows. To the extent that risk-taking incentives increase with vega, the sensitivity of R&D investments to cash flows should increase with vega because increasing vega can reduce CEOs' risk-aversion towards risky investments. On the contrary, the effects of delta on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity are ambiguous because of competing theory mentioned above. Therefore, underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion predicts that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity should increase on vega and either increase (or decrease) on delta.
However, the agency conflict between managers and shareholders also produces overinvestment problems when managers tend to pursue their own self-interests (e.g., perquisites, empire building). Managers may overinvest even in negative NPV projects and reduce firm value (e.g., Jensen 1986 , Stulz 1990 ). Since R&D investments are usually difficult to be properly evaluated and justified, R&D investments are more likely to suffer from overinvestment problem when managers have their own agenda. If overinvestment is a major agency problem in a firm, then the CEO of the firm usually invests from available cash flows more than s/he should have.
To mitigate the overinvestment problem, shareholders will provide CEOs with compensation incentives to ensure that CEOs will benefit directly from the increase in shareholder wealth and suffer directly from the decrease in shareholder wealth (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990; Murphy 1993 ). Since firms' equity value can be viewed as a call option with debt value as the striking price, shareholders' wealth will increase with stock return volatility. Therefore, shareholders will prefer higher value of vega to be awarded to CEOs because equity value increases with vega.
Thus, a higher value of vega can reduce the severity of the agency costs of overinvestment because high value of vega internalizes the financial consequences of overinvestment through executive compensation and decrease CEOs' personal wealth when they overinvest in negative NPV projects. As a result, R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity should be stronger for firms with lower value of vega and weaker for firms with greater value of vega. Therefore, overinvestment of free cash flow theory predicts that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity should decrease on vega. Similar argument can also be applied to delta because delta aligns the interest of shareholders and managers through stock price, and increasing delta can prevent managers from overinvesting in negative NPV projects and reduce stock price. Thus, free cash flow theory also predicts that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity should decrease on delta.
In addition to underinvestment and overinvestment problem associated with agency conflict between managers and shareholders, previous studies (e.g., Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) also examine firms' investment decisions when there is information asymmetry between managers/shareholders and external investors. Since external investors cannot distinguish between high versus low quality projects, they will price all projects as low quality and charge a "lemon premium". As a result, firms will rely on internal funds to invest and may pass up some positive NPV projects rather than issue securities for less than they are worth. The underlying assumption in this analysis is that managers act in the best interests of existing shareholders (Dybvig and Zender 1991) . By this assumption, an implication can be drawn is that investmentcash flow sensitivity will be strongest when the interest of managers and existing shareholders is perfectly aligned because managers will be more hesitant to raise external funds for underpriced projects.
2 As discussed previously, if a greater value of vega (and delta) indicates better interest alignment between shareholders and managers, then underinvestment from information asymmetry predicts that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity should increase on vega (and delta).
With the competing theories, the impacts of CEO incentives on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity are essentially an empirical question. To this end, we test our hypotheses with a sample of U.S. firms from 1992 to 2011. To highlight the results, we find that the sensitivity of R&D spending to cash flows increases as vega increases, and delta has no statistical significant impacts on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity. The results indicate that CEO incentives that encourage risk-taking (vega) will increase the sensitivity of risky R&D investments to cash flows.
Given the ambiguous theoretical prediction of delta's effects on managerial risk-seeking appetite, the insignificant impacts of delta on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity is not a total surprise.
The results are also of economic significance. For one standard deviation increase in vega, it will increase R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity by 58.65%. The empirical results are also consistent with the theoretical predictions. For example, both underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion and underinvestment from information asymmetry predict that R&D investmentcash flow sensitivity should increase with vega. Therefore, the baseline results may represent the combined effects of underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion, overinvestment from free cash flows and underinvestment from information asymmetry. Next, we try to isolate the impacts of each theory and investigate the channel through which managerial incentives influence R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity. To this end, we conduct several additional tests to isolate the effects of each theory.
To isolate the first channel, underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion, we identify a group of firms that are most likely to suffer from such an agency problem. Firms with more growth opportunities have better access to positive NPV projects. If CEOs of such firms are not awarded with enough risk-taking incentives to compensate managerial risk-aversion, the potential loss of walking from risky NPV projects could be tremendous for shareholders. To mitigate the underinvestment problem, shareholders of firms with greater investment opportunities should offer CEOs with higher risk-taking incentives to encourage aggressive investment behaviors. As a result, R&D investments will be more sensitive to internal funds when CEOs are offered with enough risk-taking incentives, especially for firms with greater investment opportunities. To test this hypothesis, we split the sample by the median value of Tobin's Q, with one sub-sample including firms with Tobin's Q above the median value (growth firm) and another sub-sample including firms with Tobin's Q below the median value (stable firm). We find that the effects of vega on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity are much stronger in terms of magnitude and statistics for growth firms than those for stable firms. The results are consistent with the underinvestment of managerial risk-aversion story and suggest it may be a plausible theory explanation of the baseline results: firms with better growth opportunities offer CEOs with greater risk-taking incentives to encourage more investments in R&D.
To isolate the second channel, overinvestment from free cash flows because of managerial empire building motives, we identify a group of firms that are more likely to encounter . Specifically, the effects should be strengthened for firms with potential severe overinvestment problem, such as firms with low growth opportunities and high cash flows. To test this hypothesis, we construct a sub-sample for firms with Tobin's Q below the median value and cash flow level above the median value (overinvestment firms). In contrast, we construct another sub-sample of firms that are less likely to have overinvestment problem, i.e., firms with
Tobin's Q above the median value and cash flow level below the median value. We find that vega's effects on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity of are not statistical significant for overinvestment firms, and the effects are positive and significant for firms are less likely to have overinvestment problem (i.e., high Tobin's Q and low cash flows). The results are contrary to the hypothesis drawn from overinvestment from free cash flow story, suggesting that overinvestment problem may not be the channel that managerial incentives bring out impacts on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity.
For the third channel, underinvestment problem caused by information asymmetry between firms and external investors, we identify a group of firms that are more likely to be information opaque and suffer from underinvestment problem because of expensive external funds. If the underinvestment problem is the primary driving force of the baseline results, we should expect that vega will have a greater impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity for information opaque firms than for information transparent firms. The reason is that investment projects are more likely to be underpriced for information opaque firms to create cost wedge between internal and external funds, which encourages CEOs to rely on internal funds to finance investments instead of more expensive mispriced external funds. Following extant literature (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997; Brown and Petersen 2009; Hadlock and Pierce 2010) , we consider a firm to be information transparent (opaque) if the firm has total asset above (below) the median value; firm age is greater (less) than ten years; it pays (does not pay) dividends to common shares. We find mixed results of vega's effects on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity between information opaque and information transparent firms. For both categories (transparent and opaque), vega has significant impacts on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity given the three classification criteria used in this paper. The results imply that the underinvestment problem from information asymmetry between firms and external investors may not be the theoretical explanation behind.
The combined results suggest that, among the three possible theoretical channels of CEO risk-taking incentives' effects on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity, mitigation of underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion is probably the most plausible explanation of the observed baseline results found in this paper. Firms offer risk-aversion CEOs with higher risktaking incentives so that CEOs will spend more cash flows towards investments with greater risks (e.g., R&D), particularly for firms with greater investment opportunities. One concern for our empirical analysis is the potential endogeneity between CEO compensation incentives and firms' investment decisions and the use of cash flows, i.e., the causality between CEO risktaking incentives and investments is likely to run in both directions and some omitted variables can drive the impact of CEO risk-taking incentives on investment-cash flow sensitivity (Coles et al. 2006) . We try to mitigate the endogenous concern in following ways. Hadlock (1998) show that there is a non-linear relationship between managerial share ownership and capital expenditure investment-cash flow sensitivity. Investment-cash flow sensitivity rises sharply when managerial ownership increases from zero and decreases with managerial ownership when managerial ownership reaches a certain point (5%). Broussard, Buchenroth and Pilotte (2004) examine the influence of CEO pay-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta) on capital expenditure investment-cash flow sensitivity and show that investment-cash flow sensitivity is reduced as delta increases. By linking delta to the interest alignment between managers and shareholders, the authors argue the results are consistent with the notion that increasing delta (i.e., better alignment) can reduce the overinvestment problem from free cash flows. Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) show that capital expenditures will increase with delta since a higher value of delta can mitigate managerial shirking. More recently, Xu (2013) shows that equity-based managerial compensation exacerbates information asymmetry problem by focusing on the interests of existing shareholders. Firms with greater equity-based managerial compensation have higher total investment with internal funds.
The present study is one of the few works that mainly focus on R&D investments to investigate the effects of executive compensation on investment-cash flow sensitivity. Compared to capital expenditures, R&D investment intensity has increased dramatically over past two decades and the magnitude has surpassed physical assets investment in developed economies.
Thus, R&D deserves more attention to empirically examine how executive compensation affects the relationship between R&D investments and cash flows. In addition, this paper is also among the few studies that mainly focus on managerial incentives that encourage risk-taking (i.e., vega)
instead of delta (e.g., Broussard et al. 2004; Aggarwal and Samwick 2006) or total equity compensation (e.g., Hadlock 1998; Xu 2013) to investigate the impacts of executive compensation on investment-cash flow sensitivity. Since R&D investments are unique in terms of greater uncertainty and subject to managerial discretion, vega is a more appropriate instrument to examine how risk-taking incentives affect managerial decision on R&D spending with cash flows. Indeed, our empirical results suggest that underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion is more plausible to explain the relationship between managerial incentives and R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity. This is contrast to the arguments from extant empirical studies such as overinvestment from free cash flow (e.g., Broussard et al. 2004 ) and information asymmetry between existing shareholders and external investors (e.g., Xu 2013).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample construction and provides definitions of the variables. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
Sample and variables

Sample construction
We construct our sample from three major data sources to test our hypotheses in this paper.
These sources are firms' financial and accounting information from Compustat, executive compensation information from Execucomp and borrowing firms' stock price information from CRSP. To calculate CEO risk-taking incentives, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock prices and stock return volatility (i.e., delta and vega), we attain company financial information from Compustat, stock return information from CRSP and executive compensation information from Execucomp. After calculating delta and vega, we merge them with company financial information to construct the final sample. We also exclude firms in the financial and utility industries.
CEO compensation incentives
Following Core and Guay (2002) , we measure vega as the change in the dollar value of a CEO's option portfolio given a 1% change in the annualized standard deviation of a firm's stock returns.
Delta is measured as the change in the dollar value of a CEO's options and stock portfolio given a 1% change in the value of a firm's common stock price. The partial derivatives of the option value with respect to stock return volatility and stock price are based on the Black-Scholes option pricing model adjusted for dividends by Merton (1973) . The same method is used to calculate vega and delta in recent empirical studies (e.g., Coles et al. 2006; Billet, Mauer and Zhang 2010) . The details regarding the calculation of vega and delta are provided in Appendix A.
R&D investments, cash flows and control variables
We mainly focus on R&D spending as the measure of investments in this study. Following Brown and Petersen (2009) and others, we use gross cash flow as our measure of cash flows. It adds R&D to the standard measure of net cash flow (e.g., income before extraordinary items plus depreciation) to mitigate possible measurement error in cash flow. In addition to the key variables of interest, we use a large set of control variables of firm characteristics and CEO characteristics to capture their possible effects on R&D investments and to mitigate missing variable bias. For firm characteristics, we account for firm size, sales, Tobin's Q, stock return volatility, leverage and net issuance of equity and long term debt. For CEO characteristics, we control for tenure, age and common share ownership held by each CEO. In addition, we also control for year effects, firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects with two-digit SIC codes.
The detailed definitions of these variables and other key variables used in this study are reported in Appendix B. [ Table 1 about here]
Summary statistics
Empirical Analysis
CEO risk-taking incentives and investment-cash flow sensitivity
To investigate the effects of CEO risk-taking incentives on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity, we estimate the following regression model following extant literature (e.g., Broussard et al. 2004) :
where and represent firm and year ; is the R&D spending measure for firm at year and scaled by a firm's beginning of period total assets. is the sensitivity of the CEO option portfolio to stock return volatility ($M); is the sensitivity of the CEO stock and option portfolios to stock price ($M); is our measure of cash flows scaled by a firm's beginning of period total assets. We also control for industry effects, year effects and firm fixed effects in all models. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix B.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 reports the OLS results for Equation (1) with different specifications. In Columns 1 through 3, the dependent variables are R&D spending scaled by beginning of period total assets.
In Column 1, the coefficient of CF is positive and significant, suggesting that firms' cash flows have a positive impact on R&D spending and firms with higher cash flow level will spend more on R&D. Column 2 examines the effects of vega and delta on R&D spending alone. The coefficient of vega is positive and significant at 5% while the coefficient of delta is statistical insignificant. The results suggest that CEO incentives that encourage risk-taking (vega) have a positive impact on investments with greater risks (R&D). The insignificant effects of delta on R&D spending are not surprising given the ambiguous theoretical prediction of delta's impacts on managerial risk-taking incentives. The results are also similar to those found in Coles et al. (2006) .
4
Column 3 examines the effects of CEO risk-taking incentives on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity. The key variable of interest is the interaction term between vega and CF. The coefficient of vega × CF is positive and significant at 5%, suggesting that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity increases as vega increases. The coefficient of vega itself becomes insignificant after including the interaction term, suggesting that vega's explanatory power on R&D spending is fully mediated through the interaction term. Vega's effects on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity are not only of statistical significance, but also of economic significance. For one standard deviation increase in vega, it will increase R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity by 58.65%. Among the three competing theories as previously argued, it seems that the baseline results are consistent with the underinvestment story due to managerial risk-aversion. To encourage risk-averse CEOs to take on investments with greater risks such as R&D, firms will offer CEO with greater risk-taking incentives to keep CEOs from passing up risky projects with positive NPV. However, we cannot totally rule out other possible theoretical explanation without 4 For the rest of paper, our main focus will be on vega and treat delta as a control variable.
further empirical test. For example, underinvestment story because of information asymmetry also predicts that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity increases as vega increases. In the following sections, we conduct additional empirical tests to investigate the channel through which managerial incentives will impact the relationship between R&D spending and cash flows.
Underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion
We first attempt to isolate the effects that firms offer CEO risk-taking incentives to mitigate underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion. To this end, we identify a group of firms that are more likely to encounter the issue. Tobin's Q, and then estimate Equation (1) for firms with Tobin's Q greater or less than the median value. The results are reported in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 about here]
The dependent variables are R&D spending scaled by beginning of period total asset in Table   3 . Columns 1 and 2 report the results for firms with Tobin's Q less and greater than the median value, respectively. In Column 1, the coefficient of vega × CF is not statistically significant, suggesting that vega does not have a significant impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity.
On the contrary, the coefficient of vega × CF is positive and significant at 5%, suggesting that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity increases as vega increases for firms with greater investment opportunities. The results are consistent with the managerial risk-aversion story that underinvestment is more of a problem for firms with greater growth opportunities, and a higher value of vega can mitigate such a problem. Therefore, underinvestment from managerial riskaversion could be a possible theory explanation to the baseline results.
Overinvestment from free cash flows
In addition to the underinvestment problem from managerial risk-aversion, managerial agency costs can also cause overinvestment problems when self-interest managers are not motivated to maximize shareholders' wealth and overinvest in uneconomical projects for private benefits such as empire building. Previous empirical studies (e.g. Broussard et al. 2004) have shown that overinvestment from free cash flows will be more likely to occur in firms with low growth opportunities and high cash flows. Then we identify a sub-sample of firms with cash flow level above the median value but Tobin's Q below the median value. In contrast, we identify a subsample of firms are least likely to have overinvestment problems: firms with cash flow level below the median value but Tobin's Q above the median value. Then we estimate Equation (1) for both sub-samples. The results are reported in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here]
The dependent variables are R&D spending scaled by beginning of period total assets in Table 4 . Columns 1 and 2 report the results for low Q/high Cash flow and high Q/low cash flow firms, respectively. In Column 1, the coefficient of vega × CF is not significant, suggesting that R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity does not increase as vega increases for low Q/high cash flow firms. Because a higher value of vega indicates better interest alignment between shareholders and CEOs, the results imply that the synchronization of wealth has no significant impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity, even for firms that are more likely to have overinvestment problem. This is contrary to the free cash flow overinvestment theory.
Interestingly, the coefficient of vega × CF is positive and significant at 5% level in Column 2. It suggests that vega has a significant impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms that are less likely to have overinvestment problem. The combined empirical results from Table   4 suggest that investment opportunities may have more influence on vega × CF, rather than the level of cash flows.
Underinvestment from information asymmetry
As discussed earlier, the information asymmetry between firms and external investors can generate a "lemon premium" problem and investment projects will be underpriced by external investors. As a result, managers would prefer internal funds for investments because external funds are more expensive and the managers believe their investment projects are undervalued.
To the extent that a higher value of vega (or delta) indicates CEOs invest in the best interest of existing shareholders, R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity will increase on managerial incentives, and such effects will be stronger for firms with higher degree of information asymmetry. To empirically test this hypothesis, we follow extant empirical studies (e.g. Hadlock and Pierce 2010; Acharya et al. 2007 ) to identify firms' information transparency (or opacity) level based on dividend payout, firm age and size. Large and mature firms with dividend payments are more transparent and less likely to be undervalued by external investors. Small and young firms that do not pay out are more opaque and more likely to be undervalued by external investors. Then we estimate Equation (1) for both information transparent and information opaque firms. The results are reported in Table 5 .
[ Table 5 about here]
The dependent variables are R&D spending scaled by beginning of period total assets in Table 5 . Columns 1 through 3 examine information transparent firms, i.e., firms with total asset above the median value, firm age greater than 10 years and firms pay dividends to common shares. Columns 4 through 6 examine information opaque firms, i.e., firms with total asset below the median value, firm age less than 10 years and firms do not pay dividends to common shares.
Among the three coefficients of vega × CF in columns 1 through 3, one is marginal significant at 10% and one is significant at 5%. Among the three coefficients of vega × CF in columns 4 through 6, two are significant at 5% and one is insignificant. Thus, we find mixed empirical results when splitting sample based on information asymmetry level of firms. The overall results from this section suggest that there is no conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that underinvestment due to information asymmetry contributes to the baseline results.
Robustness check
Although we use a large number of control variables and lagged values of CEO risk-taking incentives and firm financial variables to mitigate the endogenous and reverse causality concerns, we still encounter the potential missing variable bias in our baseline results that could cause some unaccounted-for firm characteristics to jointly determine CEO risk-taking incentives and investment-cash flow sensitivity. In this section, we will attempt to address this issue with an additional test by employing an instrumental variable approach and then re-estimating the baseline model results with two-stage least squares (2SLS). The ideal instrument in this case is correlated with vega (delta) but will be only indirectly correlated with investment-cash flow sensitivity through its link to vega (delta). Following extant empirical studies (e.g., Erickson et al. 2006) , we use industry average compensation practices as instrument variables for delta and vega. 5 In the first stage (untabulated), we regress vega (delta) on all independent variables and industry average vega (delta) as instrument variables. In the second stage, we replace vega and delta with the predicted values from the first-stage regression then estimate Equation (1) with the predicted values. The results from the second stage are reported in Table 6 .
[ Table 6 about here]
The dependent variables are R&D spending scaled by beginning of period total assets in Table 6 . Columns 1 and 2 report the second stage regression results of 2SLS. The results from Table 6 are consistent to those in OLS in Table 2 . All the key variables bear the same sign and significant level. Although instrument variable approach cannot completely rule out endogeneity in our analysis, it does help to improve the robustness of OLS results and indicate that vega has a significant impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Extant empirical studies also suggest the potential impacts of negative cash flows on investment-cash flow sensitivity. For example, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) show that the financial distress caused by constant negative cash flows may attribute to the non-linear relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and the degree of financial constraint.
They are argue that financial distress will attenuate firms' response to changes in cash flows and it is important to eliminate firms that have constant negative cash flows for a more accurate estimate of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Brown and Petersen (2009) show that firms with negative cash flows rely heavily on equity financing. This can lead to a bias in investment-cash flow sensitivity if external financing resources are not considered because negative cash flow firms exhibit negative investment-cash flow sensitivity.
In the present study, the effects of negative cash flow on our empirical results are insignificant. In our sample, over 80 percent of the firms have positive cash flows. In the untabulated results, we split the sample into positive cash flow firms and negative cash flow firms. After estimating Equation (1) for both positive and negative cash flow firms, we find that there is no statistical significant difference between them. Vega has a positive impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity for negative cash flow firms as well. Therefore, negative cash flows should not have a significant impact on our baseline results. In addition, we also include net debt issuance and net equity issuance as control variables in all regression models. This approach can mitigate the missing variable bias suggested by Brown and Petersen (2009) .
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effects of CEO risk-taking incentives on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity. With hypotheses derived from competing theories such as underinvestment from managerial risk-aversion, overinvestment from free cash flows and underinvestment from information asymmetry, we develop an empirical approach to isolate the potential impact of each theory on the overall results. We show that vega has a positive impact on R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity, and such effects are stronger for firms with better growth opportunities.
After additional empirical tests to investigate the theoretical channel how vega may influence R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity, we conclude that the empirical results are consistent with the notions that vega is positively related to CEO risk-seeking appetite, and firms offer CEOs with aggressive risk-taking incentives to encourage investments with greater risks and reduce agency costs from managerial risk-aversion. The results are robust to instrumental variable approach when endogeneity of CEO risk-taking incentives is taken into consideration. The overall results provide new empirical evidence on the relationship among managerial incentives, importance of interest alignment between shareholders and managers through incentive compensation. The proper synchronization has a significant impact on a firm's R&D spending and future growth, especially for firms with great investment opportunities. 
Appendix B: Variable Definitions
